Far Eastern Economic Review
By Nate Thayer in Phnom Penh
July 3, 1997
(This article came out 8 days before the Cambodian coup d-etat and the country erupted into civil war, and a few weeks before Pol Pot was put on jungle trial)
It's the philosopher's classic conundrum-in
reverse. From the dense jungles of northwestern
Cambodia has come the sound of a giant tree
falling. But since nobody in Phnom Penh has seen
it happen, nobody's certain it has.
Now, internal Khmer Rouge documents obtained by
the REVIEW throw the first clear light on the
bizarre developments surrounding Pol Pot's
recent "arrest" by former loyalists-and on the
path the rebel movement aims to take towards
political legitimacy. The documents suggest that
the events of early June were precipitated by a
deal struck in May, after three months of secret
negotiations, between moderate elements of the
Khmer Rouge and the Funcinpec party of First
Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh.
The deal, in turn, is rooted in the long-running
feud between Cambodia's two premiers, both of
whom are jockeying for alliances ahead of
general elections scheduled for 1998. It seeks
to unite the disparate political and military
forces-Funcinpec, opposition leader Sam Rainsy's
Khmer National Party and the Khmer
Rouge-arraigned against the Cambodian People's
Party of Second Prime Minister Hun Sen. The
rivalry between the two prime ministers may
offer the Khmer Rouge an opportunity to return
to the legitimate political arena, analysts say.
The two premiers recently made a rare display of
solidarity when they appeared together on June
21 to announce the seizure of Pol Pot and agreed
that he should be brought before an
international tribunal. But seasoned Cambodia
watchers say the two men were putting on a show
for an international audience. Behind the public
smiles, they say, the Ranariddh-Hun Sen rivalry
remains intense. Indeed, some political analysts
worry that the shifting alignments in Phnom Penh
could eventually throw the country back into
civil war.
Ranariddh's courting of the Khmer Rouge is rich
with irony. In 1970, his father, Prince Norodom
Sihanouk, had formed a similar alliance with a
relatively unknown Pol Pot. At the time, their
common enemy was the United States-backed Lon
Nol regime.
In 1970, the Khmer Rouge needed Sihanouk's
prestige to emerge from the jungles and onto the
political stage. Now, the rebels are banking on
Ranariddh's legitimacy to revive their fortunes.
But there is one crucial difference: Funcinpec
cannot ally itself with a Khmer Rouge that
includes the widely reviled Pol Pot. Sources
close to the negotiations say the Khmer Rouge
leadership was told they would have to separate
themselves from Pol Pot in order to make the
alliance palatable for local and international
consumption. The 69-year-old guerrilla leader
apparently went along with the deal until he
realized it would mean his own eviction and
perhaps exile.
The Khmer Rouge documents explain what happened
next. Pol Pot called a meeting of senior leaders
on the night of June 9, at a jungle encampment
near his headquarters at Anlong Veng in the
northern jungle. When former Defence Minister
Son Sen refused to turn up, a Pol Pot loyalist
was dispatched to execute him, his wife and 16
members of his family. Khmer Rouge army chief Ta
Mok, apparently sensing that a purge was under
way, slipped out of the meeting and fled into
the thick jungle.
The events of the next few days remain shrouded
in confusion. Pol Pot loyalists maintained
control of Khmer Rouge Radio at least until June
12, when they broadcast a report denouncing Son
Sen as a "traitor." The radio then fell silent.
It came back to life briefly on June 16, to
announce that "treason of Pol Pot took place on
the night of June 9 to June 14 . . . This
incident was resolved and normalcy restored as
of June 14."
One Khmer Rouge document, dated June 18, says
that the leadership uncovered a plan by Pol Pot
to kill other senior cadres in an attempt to
scuttle the deal with Funcinpec. "Pol Pot had
prepared a plan to kill the just and good
leaders and cadres who are loyal to our
principles and our good leadership," says the
document. Pol Pot's actions, it adds,
compromised the "internal solidarity . . . and
the spirit of our agreements." Sources close to
the Khmer Rouge say this is a reference to the
deal with Funcinpec.
There are other, more obvious indications of a
Funcinpec-Khmer Rouge alliance. Recent Khmer
Rouge Radio broadcasts have expressed support
for the National United Front, an anti-Hun Sen
coalition created by Ranariddh and Rainsy
earlier this year. In a May 21 internal document
obtained by the REVIEW, Khmer Rouge President
Khieu Samphan said "it should be possible for
all national forces to unite within the
framework of the NUF." The previous day,
Ranariddh had announced "a very great welcome"
to Khieu Samphan and the Khmer Rouge into the
alliance.
Ranariddh has since admitted to secretly meeting
Khieu Samphan on June 1 in the remote northern
provincial capital of Preah Vihear. In the days
following Pol Pot's apparent ouster, Khmer Rouge
Radio openly said the guerrillas would "uphold
the stand of supporting the National United
Front with . . . Ranariddh as the chairman."
Later, after a brief street battle on June 17
between bodyguards loyal to the two premiers in
Phnom Penh, Khmer Rouge radio announced an
"appeal to all combatants," to "unite in
launching an offensive against the puppets, with
Hun Sen as the most active ringleader, in an
increasing vigorous and militant manner."
Hun Sen's response was to issue Ranariddh an
ultimatum on June 18: The first prime minister,
he said, must choose to "join the Khmer Rouge or
[remain in] the Royal government."
Earlier, on June 6, Hun Sen said Ranariddh was
"rescuing the Khmer Rouge from ruin" and "taking
the wrong route by using the Khmer Rouge's Khieu
Samphan as a political counterweight to us."
The effectiveness of that counterweight is far
from certain. For one thing, there's still
considerable confusion over Pol Pot's fate. Nor
is it clear who is in control of the Khmer
Rouge-and whether the current leadership can
recast the rebels as a moderate, politically
acceptable force. Rebel radio has announced that
"a new era has begun," but has said little about
Pol Pot's hardline comrades-in-arms.
For instance, no mention has been made of Nuon
Chea, Pol Pot's chief ideologue, or of Ta Mok,
the military commander who directly controls the
bulk of the rebel troops. Cambodian military
officials who have been meeting with the rebels
in recent days say Ta Mok-one of the architects
of the Khmer Rouge's "killing fields" rule from
1975 to 1979-was a key figure in organizing the
purge of Pol Pot. Analysts say it would be just
as hard for Ranariddh to do a deal with Ta Mok
as it was with Pol Pot. ■